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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DeBRY AND HILTON TRAVEL 
SERVICES, INC., 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL 
AIRWAYS, INC., 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 14335 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant DeBry & Hilton Travel Services, Inc. 
("appellant") claimed below that defendant-respondent Capitol 
International Airways, Inc. ("respondent") breached an alleged 
agreement to pay a 5% travel agency commission to appellant 
for certain charter flights and wrongfully interfered with 
appellant's business relationship with a travel agency known 
as Prestige Vacations, Inc. ("Prestige"). 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court found that respondent performed all of 
its obligations to appellant, that appellant understood and 
agreed that a signed Charter Agency Agreement authorizing 
appellant to receive a commission was a condition precedent 
of its receipt of any such commission, that such Agreements 
were not signed and that respondent did not interfere with 
the relationship between appellant and Prestige. The Trial 
Court therefore entered judgment in favor of respondent, 
with costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant's Brief appears to challenge the evidentiary 
support for the Court's Findings and Conclusions on appel-
lant's causes of action for breach of contract. Although 
appellant's Brief alleges that respondent's conduct vis-a-
vis Prestige was somehow wrongful as to appellant, it does 
not appear that appellant is appealing the Trial Court's 
denial of relief on the causes of action for interference 
with the Prestige-Appellant relationship. 
2. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent disagrees with appellant's Statement of Facts 
and therefore gives its own Statement of Facts hereinbelow. 
Respondent's Statement of Facts makes evident the nature of 
such disagreement. 
A. Description of Parties 
Respondent is a supplemental air carrier operating pur-
suant to a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity 
issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") under the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §1301 
et seq. A supplemental air carrier is authorized to engage 
in charter transportation by air, i.e., the hiring of the 
entire capacity of an aircraft, as opposed to individually 
ticketed service (49 U.S.C. §1301(33) and (34)), but may 
carry only charterworthy groups. Among the types of charter-
worthy groups are affinity groups, governed by Part 208 of 
the Regulations of the CAB, 14 C.F.R. 208 (R. 808). 
Appellant is a travel agent whose business is the nego-
tiation of charter flights and the marketing of vacation 
tours, including negotiating with air carriers. Its owners 
and principals are Robert J. DeBry ("DeBry") and Lynn M. 
Hilton ("Hilton") who have been in the business of arranging 
charters since 1963 (R. 813). 
3. 
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B. Signed Charter Agency Agreement as Condition of 
Receipt of Commission 
A travel agent often participates in the arrangements 
for affinity group charter flights. Respondent ordinarily 
pays a 5% commission to such a travel agent, provided that 
all of the following occur: the signing of a charter flight 
contract between the group and respondent; the signing of a 
Charter Agency Agreement by the group, the travel agent and 
respondent which inter alia authorizes payment of a commis-
sion to the travel agent; the travel agent's performance of 
all its obligations under such Charter Agency Agreement; 
operation of the flight; and the payment in full to respon-
dent for the flight (R. 810, 812). (Please see Exhibit D-51 
for the form of the Charter Agency Agreement.) Appellant 
confirmed that these requirements are standard in the travel 
industry (Ex. D-38, 1|2) . 
Respondent's Regional Vice President of Sales, Irving 
H. Mansfield ("Mansfield") testified, without contradiction, 
that respondent never pays more than one agent's commission, 
that it never pays a commission without a signed Charter 
Agency Agreement and that it makes the payment to the travel 
agent authorized to receive it by the charter group in the 
Charter Agency Agreement (Tr. 171-72, 183). By signing the 
Charter Agency Agreement, it is the chartering group (i.e., 
charterer or principal) which authorizes the payment of a 
commission to the travel agent designated therein (Tr.184-85). 
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The travel agent receives a commission by retaining its 5% 
and remitting the remainder to respondent or by receiving 
its 5% after the full charter price is remitted to respon-
dent (Tr. 186). 
Respondent's policy of paying commissions to travel 
agents only where a signed agreement exists conforms to CAB 
Regulations. Section 208.31 of the Economic Regulations of 
the CAB provides the following: 
"Each agreement between a supplemental 
air carrier and any ticket or cargo agent 
shall be reduced to writing and signed by 
all the parties thereto if it relates to any 
of the following subjects: 
"...(b) arranging for flights for the 
accommdations of persons or properties;..." 
14 C.F.R. 208.31a 
CAB Regulations also prohibit a supplemental air carrier 
(such as respondent) from paying a commission to a travel 
agent if the agent receives a commission from the charterer 
for the same service, and they likewise prohibit a travel 
agent from receiving a commission from the air carrier and 
charterer for the same service (14 C.F.R. 208.202 and 208.203). 
C. Origins of Subject Flights 
With this background, we can turn to the specific facts 
5. 
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of this case. In February 1973, appellant first had con-
tact with Prestige Vacations, Inc. ("Prestige") (Tr. 23). 
Prestige, a newly formed travel agency, sought out appellant 
for assistance in arranging charter flights (Tr. 45, 246, 
287-88) for, as Mr. Edward Ford ("Ford"), the Vice President-
Sales of Prestige, acknowledged,Prestige was brand-new in 
the business. It did not have much money and, at that time, 
felt that it needed appellant's expertise to arrange charter 
flights (Tr. 288-291). DeBry characterized Prestige as ambi-
tious and aggressive, but as just getting started and without 
much money (Tr. 45). 
Prestige's business included putting together affinity 
group charters. It is not itself such a group, but it acts 
for such groups. It is the group which signs the Charter 
Agency Agreement and, by so doing, designates which travel 
agent may receive a commission (R. 814). 
Prestige had previously had contacts with respondent 
and other airlines. In September 1972, shortly after Prestige 
was incorporated, Ford introduced himself to various airlines 
including respondent (Tr. 245). Prestige attempted to arrange 
charter flights with respondent, although none had resulted 
in a contract (Tr. 293). Despite these contacts, Prestige 
felt it needed help from appellant on negotiations and 
6. 
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on posting deposits.—' 
Appellant first mentioned Prestige to respondent in a 
letter dated February 20, 1973 (Ex. P-2). Mansfield 
responded by politely warning appellant about dealing with 
this new "retailer" and by instructing appellant to "get the 
agent's contract" (Ex. P-3) . 
Appellant has designated several groups of flights as 
Chains A, C and D. For convenience, respondent will follow 
this categorization. 
1. Chain A 
In February or March, 1973, Prestige asked appellant to 
assist Prestige in arranging charter flights to be operated 
2/ 
to Jamaica in the fall of 1973. Appellant requested quota-
tions from respondent and other supplemental air carriers and 
in April obtained quotations from both respondent and Trans 
International Airlines. Although appellant encouraged 
Prestige to accept a lower quote from Trans International 
(Tr. 249, 309), Prestige selected respondent. 
1/ It is true that Mansfield advised Hilton on February 27, 
1973 (Ex. P-3) that respondent's Chicago office had not 
heard of Prestige, but even Mansfield concedes in the same 
letter that that is not conclusive. In any event, the issue 
is not whether Capitol had heard of Prestige, but whether 
Prestige knew, or could easily have learned, of Capitol with-
out the asistance of appellant. 
2/ All dates mentioned herein are in 1973, unless otherwise 
specified. 
7. 
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Respondent sent the charter contract for six Jamaica 
3/ flights to Prestige on April 30.- Respondent also mailed 
a Charter Agency Agreement to appellant on April 30. DeBry 
testified that upon receipt appellant signed the Charter 
Agency Agreement and sent it to Prestige because "they had 
to sign it" (Tr. 80). Respondent expressly advised appel-
lant that signed Charter Agency Agreements were necessary 
"in order to process your 5% commission" (Ex. D-ll). By 
approximately May 15, the Charter Agency Agreement was signed 
by all three parties: respondent, appellant and Prestige. 
Five of the six flights were operated (R. 816-18). Appel-
lant makes no claim here for any commission arising from 
the Chain A flights. 
2. Chain C 
In April and May Prestige again requested appellant to 
obtain quotations for charter flights to Jamaica for the 
winter and spring 1973-74. Appellant requested quotations 
from five airlines, including respondent. When requesting 
a quotation from respondent, appellant and respondent entered 
3/ The initial contracts for the flights in issue in this 
"~ case were signed by Prestige, although not the charter-
ing group, as matter of convenience in order to expedite the 
transactions and reserve aircraft. Pursuant to respondent's 
routine office procedures, individual contracts for the 
chartering groups were executed to replace the initial con-
tracts (Ex. D-7, Tr. 127-28, 203-04). 
8. 
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into a "preliminary oral agreement of a very loose nature" 
by which respondent agreed to quote the flights and to pay 
a 5% commission to appellant "if the flights were sold and 
if the agency agreement was executed in [appellant's] favor 
making [appellant] the agent of record" (R. 819). 
On May 8, appellant wrote to respondent alleging that 
appellant "will receive a 5% sales commission on all future 
flights or charters made by Prestige Vacation with Capitol." 
(Ex D-10). Mansfield rejected that claim on May 29. 
"With reference to your statement that 
DeBry and Hilton will receive 5% commission 
on the future flights, this has to be strictly 
a matter between you and Prestige Vacations. 
If you will examine the current agency agree-
ment, you will note that Prestige Vacations 
also has to execute this agreement and this 
holds true for any future flights. I am sure 
you can appreciate that Capitol is not in a 
position to dictate to the charterer, or prin-
ciple [sic], who they should designate as a [sic] 
agent to handle their transactions" (R. 820). 
As a result of a falling out between appellant and 
Prestige, described in more detail below, Prestige approached 
and began to deal directly with respondent. Fourteen of the 
originally scheduled Chain C flights were contracted for and 
9. 
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operated. Each of the flights operated pursuant to a charter 
contract between Capitol and the affinity group represented 
by Prestige. 
Mansfield spent four days in Salt Lake City trying to 
get a Charter Agency Agreement signed in favor of appellant/ 
but because of the animosity between appellant and Prestige, 
was unsuccessful (Tr. 171). Thus, no Charter Agency Agree-
ment disignating appellant as recipient of a commission on 
Chain C was executed (R. 8 21-23). However, individual 
Charter Agency Agreements were executed for each flight 
whereby each group authorized Prestige to receive a 5% 
commission (Tr. 202). As a result, Prestige withheld its 
commissions from monies forwarded by it for the affinity 
groups to respondent (R. 824). 
3. Chain D 
In April and May Prestige also asked appellant to obtain 
quotations for charter flights from various cities, including 
four charter flights to Munich, Germany. As for Chain C, 
appellant asked for quotations from five airlines, including 
respondent,and at the time of the request to respondent, ap-
pellant and respondent entered into a "preliminary oral agree-
ment of a very loose nature whereby appellant agreed to quote 
the four Munich flights and to pay a 5% commission to appel-
lant "if the flights were sold and if the [charter] agency 
agreement was executed in appellant's favor thus making the 
10. 
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appellant the agent of record" (R. 825). 
Respondent mailed charter quotations for the four Munich 
flights to appellant (Ex. P-23). Subsequent to the quotation, 
appellant asked for another quotation for a series of eight 
flights to Munich (Chain D) to be in lieu of the foregoing 
four flights. Prestige's letter of July 19 advised appellant 
"If your program meets with our approval 
we are then prepared to sign an Agency Agree-
ment giving DeBry and Hilton a 5% commission 
on the total package." (Ex. P-24) 
Prestige never considered appellant to be Prestige's agent on 
Chain D (Tr. 310); it therefore asked a second travel agent 
to get quotations for the same flights. Learning this, respon-
dent declined to get "into an aution block" or to be "a shill 
at this auction" by giving quotes to different persons for 
the same flights (Tr. 169; Ex. P-27). 
On approximately July 18 Prestige contacted respondent 
directly regarding the Munich flights and followed-up with 
a letter to respondent (Ex. P-24). Respondent eventually 
worked out an agreement with Prestige for the Munich flights. 
As DeBry acknowledged, all of the negotiations for the 
Munich flights were conducted by Prestige (Tr. 110, 281). 
Each of the flights was chartered by an affinity group which 
signed a charter contract with respondent; each affinity 
group also signed a Charter Agency Agreement designating 
11. 
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Prestige as the travel agent to receive the 5% commission 
(Tr. 203-04). The 5% commission thereon was deducted by 
Prestige from monies collected from the charter groups 
(R. 825-28). 
D. Deterioration of Relationship Between Appellant and 
Prestige 
Since the acrimonious breakdown of the relationship be-
tween appellant and Prestige led to the filing of this action, 
y 
it is necessary to trace that relationship in more detail. 
As indicated above, the relationship began because of 
Prestige's two initial deficiencies: inexperience and lack 
of money. The witnesses for both appellant and Prestige 
agreed that the relationship between them began auspiciously, 
that it developed to the point that a merger between the two 
of them was under active consideration, that the relationship 
then deteriorated rapidly and resulted* in a lawsuit by appel-
lant against Prestige. 
According to Ford, one of the critical requirements of 
the relationship was for appellant to put up the deposits 
with Capitol as an essential condition in order to receive 
a commission on the flights (Tr. 247, 250-51). Appellant 
4/ Respondent traces the breakdown of the relationship 
"~ between appellant and Prestige not to argue that either 
one was "right" in its charges against the other, but to 
demonstrate that that breakdown was the reason for Prestige 
dealing directly with respondent and the reason for Prestige 
refusing to authorize the payment of commissions to respondent. 
12. 
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apparently agreed to that condition (Tr. 259-60). However, 
when it came time to post the deposits on the Chain C flights, 
appellant at the last minute apparently refused to do so. 
According to Ford, that refusal baffled Prestige and just 
about ended their relationship. Ford testified that appel-
lant's failure to live up to its agreement to post the deposit 
"jeopardized the very movement itself with a loss of hundreds 
of thousands of dollars" (Tr. 264). 
Appellant also advised respondent that "If they [i.e. 
appellant] don't put up any money, they will not be our agent" 
(Ex. D-20, Tr. 262-66). Appellant refused to put up the 
deposits for Chain C, nor did it put up any deposits for 
Chain D (Ex. D-20). 
In order to avoid its threatened loss, Prestige began 
increasingly to deal directly with respondent. It renewed 
the direct contacts which it had initiated with respondent 
before appellant became involved. As a result, it was able 
to salvage the Chain C and Chain D flights by working out 
the arrangements with respondent. 
Appellant recognized that it acted as agent for Prestige 
only as long as it could keep Prestige "happy" (Tr. 233; 
Ex. D-14). Therfore, during the course of their relationship, 
appellant constantly pressed for a formal appointment as 
exclusive agent for Prestige in arranging charter flights 
(Tr. 267-68). For example, appellant wrote Prestige on 
May 21: 
13, 
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"•..we ask that Prestige Vacations appoint 
DeBry-Hilton as their exclusive operators on a 
permanent basis." 
(Ex. D-14) 
Prestige, however, never consented to any such exclusive 
arrangement. 
A number of things then came together to destroy the 
once budding relationship between them: Prestige was dis-
satisfied with the quality of service it was receiving from 
appellant; it resented appellant's efforts to tie up Prestige 
on an exclusive basis; it resented appellant's efforts to 
treat every bid request by Prestige as a creation of an 
agency relationship; it resented the fact that appellant's 
correspondent was filled with legal jargon, derogatory re-
marks and threats of lawsuits; it distrusted appellant's 
overreaching in trying to get Prestige to commit to a 7% 
commission arrangement (Tr. 266, 310, 267-68, 303-10, 273-
279, 296; Ex. D-37). All this is, of course, in addition 
to the breakdown of the merger negotiations between the 
two parties and the failure of appellant, in Prestige's view, 
to honor its commitment to put up the deposits with respon-
dent. 
By as early as July 5, appellant was remonstrating with 
Prestige because it had not signed Charter Agency Agreements 
(Ex. D-22). On July 19 Prestige chastised appellant for 
"dropping the ball" by not putting up the Chain C deposit 
14. 
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of $13,500, reiterated its prior statement that appellant 
could become its agent "at any time you want to put up the 
$13,500" and declined to sign Charter Agency Agreements in 
appellant's favor (Ex. D-25). By August 8 Prestige wrote 
to both respondent and Trans International Airways that 
appellant "failed to meet our requirements" (Exs. D-31 
and D-32). After more increasingly bitter correspondence 
(Exs. D-33 and D-34), the parties ended in threats of liti-
gation (Ex. D-35). And litigation, in fact, ensued. 
E. Results of Breakdown of Relationship Between Appellant 
and Prestige 
The deterioration and eventual collapse of the relation-
ship between appellant and Prestige had a number of reper-
cussions regarding the Chain C and D flights. First, it led 
to a series of acrimonious and threatening letters between 
them (e.g., Exs. D-38 and D-41). Second, appellant's threat 
of a lawsuit caused Prestige to notify respondent by letter 
of October 9, 1973 to "freeze" all commissions otherwise 
payable to appellant by respondent "until the suit is 
resolved" (Ex. D-43). As a result of that instruction, 
respondent's check for the commissions on Chain A flights 
in the amount of $7,287 was made payable to both Prestige 
15. 
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and Appellant (R. 178).-' Third, the end of the relationship 
between appellant and Prestige led Prestige to renew direct 
contracts with respondent, as indicated above. Fourth, it led 
to the filing of a complaint by appellant against Prestige 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Civil No. 216397. In that complaint, appellant alleged that 
Prestige wrongly did the following: instructed respondent to 
withhold the Chain A commissions from appellant; breached the 
alleged agreement to have commissions paid to appellant on the 
Chain C flights; and wrongly denied appellant the opportunity 
to earn commissions on the Chain D flights. The prayer is for 
amounts equal to the 5% commission for Chains A, C and D 
flights (R. 435-42). Prestige and appellant eventually 
settled that lawsuit: Prestige endorsed the Chain A check 
over to appellant and paid appellant an additional amount of 
$7,713 in full settlement of all of appellant's claims against 
Prestige (Ex. D-54, p. 9-10). As part of the settlement, the 
lawsuit against Prestige was dismissed with prejudice and 
appellant formally released Prestige from "all claims.11 
(R. 432-433]). 
5/ The "freeze" affected the Chain A commissions; it did 
~~ not affect Chain C or Chain D commissions since no 
Charter Agency Agreement authorizing the payment of those 
commissions to appellant was ever in effect (Tr. 315). 
16. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLANT'S PRINCIPLE CONTENTION AMOUNTS 
TO AN ALLEGATION THAT THERE IS NOT SUF-
FICIENT EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT FOR THE FIND-
INGS. THAT CONTENTION IS WHOLLY UNFOUNDED. 
••:!.'. Appellant's Position 
Appellant contends that it was the "procuring cause" of 
the Chain C and D flights and that it is therefore entitled to 
recover commissions therefor, despite the fact that Charter 
Agency Agreements were not executed in appellant's favor for 
those flights. That contention is in direct conflict with the 
Trial Court's Findings. The Trial Court found that by reason 
of the dealings of the parties, the Regulations of the CAB, 
the preliminary agreements between respondent and the practice 
in the industry, appellant understood and agreed that no such 
commission would be paid unless written Charter Agency Agree-
ments were executed in their favor. The Trial Court also found 
that the only understanding between respondent and appellant 
regarding Chain C and D flights were the "preliminary agree-
ments of a very loose nature" and that appellant performed all 
its obligations under such agreements (R. 799-802). 
Therefore, appellant's argument is simply an attack on the 
evidentiary support for the Findings. If there is such 
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evidentiary support, the judgment must be affirmed.-' 
There can be no doubt that the evidence not only supports, 
but compels, the Trial Court's findings. Indeed, appellant 
does not directly challenge such evidentiary support. Instead, 
appellant argues—without explaining—that the theory of 
"procuring cause" somehow supersedes the evidence and the 
Findings. 
It is important to note that appellant does not allege 
that it is entitled to recover by virtue of any contract im-
plied by custom in the travel industry (Tr. 147, 212). As set 
forth in the heading to its Point I, it alleges that it was 
the "procuring cause" as part of oral brokerage agreements 
and a unilateral contract (App. Br. 8). And a purported con-
tract provision—that commissions be payable for being the 
"procuring cause" without a signed Charter Agency Agreement— 
cannot be implied because it would directly conflict with an 
express term—that no commission be payable without a signed 
Charter Agency Agreement. 
111
 [t]he introduction of an implied term into 
the contract of the parties . . . can only be 
justified when the implied term is not inconsistent 
6/ Appellant expresses its argument in several ways: recov-
ery on procuring cause, waiver of the signed Charter 
Agency Agreement requirement, breach of a purported agreement 
between appellant and respondent and an alleged failure to 
make a finding on appellant's procuring cause theory. Each 
is a variation of an attack on the evidentiary support for 
the Findings. 
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with some express term of the contract and where 
there arises from the language of the contract 
itself, and the circumstances under which it was 
entered into, an inference that it is absolutely 
necessary to introduce the term of effectuate the 
intention of the parties.111 
11 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1292, at 34-36 (3rd Ed. 1968). 
While appellant's arguments are laced with attacks on 
respondent for dealing directly with Prestige, those attacks 
provide no support for its position. They are merely a 
variation on the causes of action in the complaint for alleged 
interference by respondent with contract and business rela-
tions between appellant and Prestige. The Trial Court found 
no such interference occurred, and appellant has elected not 
to appeal therefrom. 
2. The Trial Court's Findings Are Supported 
by Substantial Evidence. Therefore, 
Appellant's Challenge of the Findings 
Must be Rejected. 
The Trial Court made detailed Findings on all of the 
principal issues in the action (R. 797-804). The evidence not 
only supports, but compels such Findings. Even assuming that 
there is a conflict in the evidence, the issue here is not 
whether such conflict exists, but whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the Trial Court's Findings. It is clear 
from the facts—many of them stipulated—that there is sub-
stantial evidence to support the Trial Court's Findings. It 
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is also clear that the Trial Court's interpretation of the 
applicable CAB Regulations is reasonable and proper. As indi-
cated below, appellant's arguments do not refute the eviden-
tiary support for the Findings and Conclusions. Therefore, 
the judgment should be affirmed. 
"It is of no consequence what our opinion may be 
as to the facts. If there is substantial evidence 
to sustain the verdict, this court is powerless to 
set it aside." 
Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co. (1926) 68 U. 85, 
249 Pac. 437, 443. 
". . .on conflicting matters the evidence on appeal 
is to be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
party for whom judgment was entered, and when so 
viewed, if there is sufficient competent evidence 
supporting the judgment, it will not be disturbed." 
Christensen v. Christensen (1959) 9 U.2d 102, 
339 P.2d 101, 103. 
The parties stipulated and the Trial Court found that 
appellant and respondent entered into a preliminary agreement 
of a very loose nature whereby respondent agreed to quote 
prices for each of Chains C and D. The Court also found that 
respondent did, in fact, quote such prices. Appellant concedes 
that respondent quoted prices on Chain C. Although respondent 
refused to quote prices for the revised series of eight Munich 
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flights, it did quote prices for the four original Chain D 
flights, as it agreed to do (Ex. P-23) and there is thus 
support for the Finding on Chain D. 
The parties stipulated and the Trial Court found that 
appellant and respondent agreed that commissions were payable 
to Chains C and D only if Charter Agency Agreements were 
executed designating appellant to receive such commissions. 
The Court did not credit appellant's allegation that there 
was any other agreement. If found that there was not, and 
there is no credible evidence to the contrary. 
The Trial Court found that appellant understood and agreed 
that commissions would not be paid unless such Charter Agency 
Agreements were executed by Prestige, respondent and appellant 
because of appellant's dealings with respondent, the Regula-
tions of the CAB, the nature of the preliminary agreements 
and the practice in the industry. The Statement of Facts above 
provides ample support for the Finding. 
The Trial Court found that Prestige refused to execute 
Charter Agency Agreements because of its falling out with 
appellant and that such refusal was not caused by respondent. 
Sections D and E of the Statement of Facts hereinabove make 
it clear that such Findings are based on substantial evidence. 
Indeed, there is no substantial evidence which would support 
a contrary finding. 
The Findings and Conclusions related to CAB Regulations 
are supported by the evidence and the language of those 
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Regulations. The Regulations provide that a written agreement 
is necessary in order to pay a commission to a travel agent. 
In light of the experience of appellant in the travel field, 
the Trial Court could properly infer that it knew of this 
Regulation and therefore knew that a written agreement was 
required. The Conclusion that the Regulation prohibits re-
covery here because of the absence of a written agreement is 
a permissible, indeed necessary, interpretation of the Regula-
tion. The Regulations also provide that commissions cannot 
be paid by a charterer and air carrier to the same agent for 
the same service. In light of the payment of $15,000 by 
Prestige to appellant, the Trial Court was justified in con-
cluding that appellant had received commissions from the 
charterers represented by Prestige for the Chain C and D 
flights and that, under the Regulations, appellant is barred 
from recovering commissions from respondent for the same 
flights. 
Since the thrust of appellant1s arguments is an attack 
on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Findings, 
the fact that there is sufficient evidence therefor means 
that the judgment should be affirmed. While respondent deals 
hereinafter with the various arguments made in appellant's 
brief, it must be emphasized that its arguments must fail 
because they do not show there was insufficient evidence to 
support the Findings. 
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B. THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY APPELLANT DO NOT 
SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF A "PROCURING 
CAUSE" THEORY TO THE FACTS HERE. 
In support of its "procuring cause" argument, appellant 
relies on a quotation from American Jurisprudence, a law 
review article, a Utah case in which the claim of a finder 
to a commission on the sale of stock was rejected, some real 
estate broker cases and an alleged offer of a unilateral con-
tract by respondent's advertising. Appellant's reliance is 
misplaced. None of its arguments is in point. 
1. American Jurisprudence Quotation 
Inapplicable. 
Whatever the utility of the American Jurisprudence quota-
tion on brokerage generally may be in other contexts, it is 
beside the point here. The only question here is whether 
appellant is entitled to a commission and, even if one were to 
concede that appellant acted as a broker, that does not resolve 
the question. Whether a broker is entitled to compensation, 
and the amount of such compensation, is determined by the 
agreement of the parties, not merely by calling him a broker. 
Here, the agreement was that no compensation was payable 
without a signed Charter Agency Agreement. There is no 
support for the proposition that designating a party as a 
"broker" automatically carries with it a particular arrange-
ment on the amount of compensation or the elimination of con-
ditions to be fulfilled before any compensation is paid, and 
appellant cites none. 
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If appellant is arguing that its introduction of Prestige 
to respondent automatically requires commissions, the argument 
is contradicted by the facts. Ford testified that he already 
knew respondent; thus, appellant did not even perform the 
introduction (Tr. 245) . Moreover, appellant admitted that an 
introduction alone does not entitle a travel agent to a 5% 
commission on all business developing from that introduction 
(Ex. D-54, p. 1). Most important, the stipulated facts flatly 
7/ 
reject such an argument.— 
Appellant's attempted characterization of itself as a 
"broker" is not supported by the facts. Under the undisputed 
facts, appellant was simply the agent of Prestige to obtain 
quotations on charter flights from respondent. That agency 
included the possibility that Prestige would designate appel-
lant to receive commissions. However, it also included the 
7/ "The general practice of defendant Capitol in processing 
and paying a five percent commission is as follows: 
(a) When the charter contract is sent by Capitol 
to the travel agent for delivery to an execution by 
the customer, a Charter Agency Agreement is enclosed. 
(b) A standard cover letter goes with the documents 
described above. That cover letter instructs the 
travel agent to get all of the documents signed by the 
customer and to himself sign the Charter Agency Agree-
ment in addition to getting the customer's signature 
thereto, and to return the documents to Capitol's 
sales office. 
(c) Defendant Capitol pays the five percent agent's 
commission only to the agent which gets the Charter 
Agency Agreement signed by the customer in his favor and 
fulfills the requirements set forth in said Agreement. 
(d) In no event is an agent's commission earned or 
paid unless and until the flight is actually flown and 
the amount of the contract therefor fully paid to Capitol." 
(R. 812) 
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possiblity—known to appellant—that Prestige would not so 
designate respondent. Appellant took that risk. 
2. Wohlmuth Law Review Article Does Not 
Deal With Commissions 
Appellant cites a law review article for the proposition 
that advertising by an air carrier means that a travel agent 
arranging a flight for a customer on that carrier is thereby 
entitled to a commission from the carrier. What appellant 
neglects to advise the Court is that the article deals with 
the liability of travel agents for events occurring during 
the customer's trip (not with the agent's right to commissions), 
that the article deals with individually ticketed passengers 
(not affinity groups) and that the author's discussion of 
agency and brokerage is in the context of the customer's claim 
against the travel agent. 
The portion of the article on which appellant relies most 
heavily is the author's suggestion that carriers give standing 
offers of unilateral contracts to travel agents. Appellant has, 
however, misstated the nature of the article. Its brief 
states that such standing offers are,(according to the author) 
made by a carrier's advertising to travel agents. In fact, 
the author says they are made in the agency agreement. Here, 
of course, the Trial Court found that there was no "agency 
agreement" or other agreement requiring payment, absent a 
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signed Charter Agency Agreement.—' Moreover, the above por-
tion of the article is admitted by the author to be "one 
suggested scheme of contractual relations . . . [which] may 
depend upon the facts in particular cases" and not an analysis 
of applicable case law. Wohlmuth, The Liability of Travel 
Agents, A Study in the Selection of Appropriate Legal Principles, 
40 Temple L.Q. 29, 46 (1966). The article is, in short, not 
in point here. There is nothing in it even suggesting a 
decision contrary to that of the Trial Court. 
Based on a misreading of the Wohlmuth article, appellant 
contends that respondent's advertising constituted a unilateral 
offer to appellant. First, the article is no support for the 
argument. Second, no such advertisement is in the record and, 
therefore, there is no factual support whatever for the argu-
ment. The Court can hardly construe the terms of an "offer" 
it cannot examine. Third, the stipulated facts are directly 
to the contrary (R. 812). 
8/ Appellant further claims that the article states that the 
travel agent "accepts" the unilateral offer merely by 
bringing "the customer to the carrier" (App. Br. p. 10), How-
ever, the article says taht the offer is only accepted when 
the travel agent performs three services: (1) books the client 
with the carrier; (2) issues the required confirmation or 
tickets to the client; and (3) collects a deposit or prepayment 
from the client and remits it to the carrier (at 46). Thus, 
Wohlmuth's discussion is contrary to appellant's interpretation. 
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3. May Case Not In Point 
Appellant finds support in Frederick May & Company v. 
Dunn, 13 U.2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962). In that case the 
Court denied recovery to a purported broker. Moreover, even 
the portion of the opinion quoted by appellant makes is clear 
that the concept of "procuring cause" is more than simply the 
introduction of a buyer to a seller. Here, appellant did not 
even introduce Prestige to respondent. There were at least 
two contacts between Prestige and respondent prior to any 
activity by appellant. Moreover, appellant understood from 
the prior Charter Agency Agreements whifch were executed that 
it was required to have Charter Agency Agreements exeucted in 
its favor for Chains C and D and that it was required to per-
form its duties thereunder as agents of Prestige in order to 
receive any commissions from respondent. 
But the principal omission from appellant's discussion 
of the May case is any attempt to compare the facts underlying 
the quoted portion of May with the facts here. The May Court 
was clearly assuming that a broker is entitled to a commission 
as the "procuring cause" only where the broker and his prin-
cipal so agree and where there is no condition precedent to 
such commission. Here, the agreement and understanding of the 
parties was to the contrary: nothing in any agreement required 
respondent to pay appellant a commission as an alleged "pro-
curing cause" and the condition precedent of a signed Charter 
27. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Agency Agreement is totally inconsistent with any such 
requirement. 
The Trial Court found that the only agreement between 
respondent and appellant required a signed Charter Agency 
Agreement as a condition precedent of any obligation of 
respondent to pay commissions to appellant and that such con-
dition precedent was not fulfilled because of the decision of 
Prestige not to do so. Based on stipulated facts and undis-
puted evidence, the Findings can hardly be attacked (R. 810, 
812). Thus, appellant had to prove its performance and failed 
to do so. Nothing in May suggests that, under those circum-
stances, any commission is owing. 
4. Facts Here Not Analogous to Real 
Estate Broker Cases 
Appellant's citation of real estate broker cases is also 
wide of the mark. Real estate brokerage is obviously a spe-
cialized area with a body of law unto itself. A real €>state 
broker seeking a commission must prove the terms of his list-
ing agreement and that the listing agreement was in writing. 
It is true that the language of most listing agreements allows 
recovery where the broker is the procuring cause. However, 
there is no real estate listing agreement here, nor anything 
analogous to it. Therefore, the "procuring cause" langauge 
of the cases cited by appellant cannot properly be lifted from 
them and applied—out of context—to the facts here. Here, 
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the only agreement expressly excluded recovery on a "procur-
ing cause" theory. 
Moreover, the real estate cases impose a duty to pay a 
commission only on the party who hires the broker. Here, 
it is clear that Prestige, not respondent, hired appellant; 
that appellant was working in the interest of Prestige by 
"shopping" Prestige's requests for quotations to many air-
lines; and that appellant's principal was Prestige, not respon-
dent. Appellant itself recognized this when it sued Prestige 
for commissions and recovered them by settling that action. 
This action is simply an attempted second trip to the same 
well. 
There is no reason to analogize brokerage cases to this 
case, and every reason not to do so. Brokerage cases rest on 
the introduction of a buyer to a seller. A typical broker 
represents a seller and seeks out a potential buyer who is 
then unknown to the seller. In most situations, there are 
literally hundreds or thousands of potential buyers, and the 
efforts of the broker are thus material. Without such efforts, 
a seller might never learn the identity of a potential buyer. 
Here, however, there is a very limited number of supplemental 
air carriers, and it is obvious that Prestige either knew, or 
would easily have learned, the names of all such carriers. 
Thus, the "introduction" function of appellant—even if it had 
introduced respondent to Prestige—was a matter of form rather 
than substance. 
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Plaintifffs purported analogy of a travel agent to a 
real estate broker is thus inapt, except in one respect. 
Contracts for real estate brokerage commissions are unenforce-
able unless signed in writing by the person allegedly liable 
for the commission. Thusf a broker cannot collect his com-
mission, even though he brings the buyer and seller together 
and the sale is consummated, unless there is a written 
9/ 
contract.—• 
The same is true of the purported agreement between plain-
tiff and defendant: as indicated above, that agreement was 
required to be in writing as a condition of plaintiff's 
receiving a commission under applicable CAB regulations, the 
practice within the air travel industry and the understanding 
of the parties. Just as oral claims of real estate brokers 
to commissions are unenforceable by statute, so are oral 
claims of travel agents unenforceable by CAB Regulations 
adopted pursuant to statute. 
9/ "In the following cases every agreement shall be void un-
less such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: 
11
. . . (5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation." 
Utah Code Annotated 25-5-4. This fundamental rule was first 
codified in Utah in 1888 and serves the same public policy: 
it prevents conflicting claims and double recoveries. As a 
gloss to the statute, Utah case law also prevents quantum 
meruit recovery unless unjust enrichment was knowingly received 
E.g., Watson v. Odell (1921) 58 U. 276, 198 Pac. 772; Case v. 
Ralph (1920) 56 U. 243, 188 Pac. 640; Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard 
Co. (1912) 41 U. 404, 125 Pac. 860. 
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C. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SIGNED CHARTER AGENCY 
AGREEMENT WAS KNOWN AND AGREED TO BY BOTH 
PARTIES. IT IS BASED IN EXPERIENCE AND CAB 
REGULATIONS AND WAS NOT A MERE FORMALITY. 
Appellant argues that a condition precedent of a signed 
Charter Agency Agreement was simply a "formality" from which 
appellant should be excused. There is no support for such a 
contention in the record here or in the applicable law. First, 
it is undisputed that respondent's practice is and was to pay 
a commission only to a travel agent designated in writing by 
a chartering organization, to pay only one such commission, 
and to pay such commission only pursuant to a such written 
agreement. The reasoning behind this practice is obvious: 
while respondent is willing to pay one 5% commission, it 
obviously wants to protect itself from the possibility of 
being compelled to pay two or more 5% commissions. It is 
possible that more than one travel agent will claim the com-
mission for a particular charter flight— in fact, that is pre-
cisely what happened here when Prestige and appellant both 
claimed commissions on the Chain C and D flights—and respon-
dent must thus have a means of protecting itself. If a written 
contract is the sole criterion of obtaining such commission, 
the problem of possible double liability of respondent is 
easily eliminated. 
Second, appellant knew of the requirement of a signed 
Charter Agency Agreement. Mansfield had expressly told appel-
lant of the requirement. The "preliminary agreements of a 
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very loose nature" included the requirement. Such Agreements 
were signed for Chain A and, thus, appellant was not only 
familiar with the necessity of the Agreements, but the precise 
terms thereof. Hilton and DeBry had been arranging charters— 
including charters with respondent—since 1963 (R. 813). The 
inference is proper, if not compelled, that they, as experts 
in the travel field, knew of the CAB requirement of a written 
4. 10/ 
contract.—' 
Third, Mr. DeBry acknowledged that commissions from an-
other carrier, TIA, were paid only when documentation was 
signed (Tr. 31); DeBry's letter to Prestige of July 5 confirms 
this (Ex. D-22). 
Fourth, there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
appellant in any way took exception to respondent's require-
ment of a signed Charter Agency Agreement at the time of the 
events. Appellant was more than willing to go forward with 
its dealings with both Prestige and respondent, knowing that 
a signed Charter Agency Agreement was required. It was only 
after appellant's falling-out with Prestige that appellant 
began to challenge the requirement of a written agreement. 
Fifth, apart from appellant's presumed knowledge of 
§204.31a, the Section itself bars recovery. This is an 
10/ Counsel for appellant alleged below that appellant's 
president was an expert in the travel field. "I think 
Mr. DeBry is qualified here as an expert witness due to his 
years and experience in this particular chain "X" group of 
flights." (Tr. 30). 
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additional ground in support of the Trial Court's decision, 
but is not necessary to that decision nor to an affirmance 
by this Court. Where a contract is required by law to be in 
writing, the enforcement of rights based on such a contract is 
conditioned on proof that the contract has, in fact, been 
reduced to writing and signed by the parties. Palo & Dodini 
v. City of Oakland (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 739, 180 P.2d 764. 
D. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
CLAIM THAT RESPONDENT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO 
INSIST ON A SIGNED CHARTER AGENCY AGREEMENT 
Appellant contends that respondent, by its conduct, "waived" 
the requirement that a Charter Agency Agreement be signed by 
all parties as a condition of the payment of commissions to 
appellant. None of the subpoints under that heading deal with 
the doctrine of waiver. Nevertheless, respondent will respond 
here to the arguments made by appellant. 
Waiver is usually defined as an intentional relinquishment 
of a known right supported by consideration or estoppel. 
(Restatement, Contracts §297; 3A Corbin, Contracts §764) That 
definition alone is sufficient to rebut appellant's contention. 
Nothing in the record lends any support to the notion that 
respondent intended to relinquish its right to insist on a 
signed Charter Agency Agreement—all the evidence is to the 
contrary. Moreover, respondent received no consideration and, 
even under its own theory, appellant did not rely to its 
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detriment (i.e., it did not tell Prestige to deal directly 
with respondent). It was a matter of complete indifference 
to respondent whether it paid a commission to appellant or 
not. It was clearly going to pay a commission to someone, 
and that someone was the agent selected by the charter group. 
1. There Was Nothing Improper In Respondent 
Dealing Directly With Prestige 
Appellant contends that respondent, by dealing directly 
with Prestige, prevented execution of the Charter Agency 
Agreements. This is simply a variation of the allegation of 
the complaint that respondent wrongfully interfered with 
apellant's relationship with Prestige. As indicated above, 
the Findings are that respondent did not so interfere, and 
no appeal has been taken on that point. 
Appellant's position seems to be embodied in its allega-
tion that "the net legal effect is that respondent fired 
appellant in the middle of the negotiations" (App. Br. 19). 
That contention is untrue. The evidence compels the conclu-
sion—and the Trial Court so found—that the falling-out 
between Prestige and appellant led Prestige to approach 
respondent. Respondent had not hired and did not "fire" 
appellant. 
In short, the Trial Court found that appellant knew that 
signed Charter Agency Agreements were required as a condition 
of the payment of commissions, that such agreements were not 
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executed, that the reason for nonexecution was traceable to 
the relationship between Prestige and appellant and not to 
any interference or actions by respondent and that respondent 
performed all of the obligations which it may have had under 
the "preliminary agreements of a very loose nature" regarding 
Chains C and D. In view of such findings and the evidentiary 
support therefor, and in view of the failure of appellant to 
appeal on this point, its argument is unfounded and irrelevant. 
Appellant has not appealed from the adverse Findings and 
Conclusions on its causes of action for wrongful interference 
with its relationship with Prestige.—' Nevertheless, it 
seeks to influence the Court in that direction by implying 
there was something improper in respondent's actions. Since 
the finding of no interference by respondent with the appel-
lant Prestige relationship is strongly supported by the record, 
appellant's argument that respondent's conduct prevented the sign-
ing of the Charter Agency Agreements has no force. There was 
nothing improper in respondent's actions, and insofar as apel-
lant's argument depends on such impropriety, the argument 
must fail. 
11/ One can understand appellant's reason for not appealing 
from the Trial Court's Finding of no interference. Where 
a party causes a breach of contract by exercising his rights, 
he incurs no liability. Gammon v. Fed. Milk Prod. Assn. 
(1961) 11 U.2d 421, 360 P.2d 1018, reh. den. 12 U.2d 1891,364 
P.2d 417. 
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Capitol International Airways, Inc. Enforcement Proceeding, 
46 CAB 385 (1967), cited by appellant, is not in point. In 
that case the CAB was faced with a situation where a travel 
agent misappropriated funds paid to him by a charter group, 
after a charter agreement between the group and Capitol was 
signed. Under the peculiar factual context there—including 
a signed Charter Agency Agreement—the group was given credit 
for the monies, thus enabling it to have its charter flight. 
2. There Is No Evidence of a Forfeiture 
Appellant also argues that enforcement of the executed 
contract condition would result in an "unconscionable for-
feiture after substantial performance." Since it was Prestige, 
not respondent, which refused to sign Charter Agency Agree-
ments designating appellant to receive commissions, that argu-
ment should be addressed to Prestige. In fact, that is just 
what appellant did when it sued Prestige for the same commis-
sions involved in this action. As part of the settlement of 
that lav/suit, appellant was paid $15,000 by Prestige. 
The premise of appellant's "forfeiture" argument is that 
"Respondent entered into an oral brokerage agreement with 
appellant under which appellant was to find a customer 
[Prestige] . . . [and] to secure the business for Respondent" 
(App. Br. 21-22). The statement is made of whole cloth and 
represents appellant's utter disregard for the facts. For 
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appellant to assert that its first contact was with respondent 
and that it then sought out Prestige in behalf of respondent 
is a mockery of the record and of appellant's own allegations 
of interference with business advantage. 
Furthermore, it is simply untrue to allege that appellant 
"substantially performed" its obligations. If, by that, appel-
lant means that it performed its obligations to respondent, 
that is demonstrably untrue: it did not do the one thing 
which respondent required as a condition of paying commissions 
—it did not produce Charter Agency Agreements in its own 
favor. If appellant means that it substantially performed its 
obligations to Prestige, that argument is unsupported by the 
record and irrelevant to the dispute between respondent and 
appellant. For example, Ford testified that one of the prin-
cipal obligations of appellant to Prestige was to post de-
posits for the flights. It is undisputed that deposits on 
Chain C and D were not posted by appellant. More important, 
whether or not appellant performed its obligations to Prestige 
can have no effect on appellant's rights against respondent. 
E. APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY CAB REGULA-
TIONS PROHIBITING DOUBLE COMMISSION 
Appellant's Brief attacks the Trial Court's Conclusion 
that appellant may not recover because of CAB Regulations 
37. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
208,202 and 208.203 (14 C.F.R. 208.202 and 208.203).—^ 
While approval of that Conclusion is not necessary to sustain 
the judgment, since it is supportable on other grounds, 
respondent submits that the Trial Court was correct. 
The Regulations are, despite appellant's protests to the 
contrary, applicable to travel agents as well as air carriers. 
For example, §208.203 applies only to travel agents. These 
two regulatory sections prohibit the payment of commissions 
by an air carrier (respondent) and a charterer (Prestige and/ 
or the affinity groups it represented) to the same travel 
agent (appellant) for the same service. 
Appellant sued Prestige for the precise commissions at 
issue here and appellant admits that the $15,000 it received 
in the settlement with Prestige applied to "all claims" 
against Prestige. The Court below, after weighing all the 
evidence, found that such $15,000 "constituted, at least, in 
part, commissions on the Chain C and D Flights." (Finding of 
Fact XV, R. 802) A party is obviously bound by his own 
settlement. White v. Pac. St. S & L (1899) 21 U. 23, 59 Pac. 
527 
12/ "The carrier shall not pay any commission whatsoever to 
an agent if the agent receives a commission from the 
charterer for the same service." 14 C.F.R. §208.202 
"A travel agent may not receive a commission from both 
a direct air carrier and the charterer for the same service." 
14 C.F.R. §208.203. 
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Appellant has not identified any agency services which 
appellant performed for either respondent or Prestige which 
were not simultaneously performed for the other (E.g., 
Tr. 228-31; Ex. D-54 pp. 4-8). Despite the force of the Trial 
Court's Findings and Conclusions, appellant claims a right 
to additional commissions for "the same service" on two 
grounds. 
First, appellant contends Prestige did not pay commissions 
to appellant because Prestige deducted 5% before paying respon-
dent, rather than paying the full charter price and receiving 
a check back from respondent. That is a distinction without 
a difference. Second, appellant reads the Regulations to mean 
that the travel agent can receive commissions from both the 
carrier and charterer, provided the total does not exceed 5%. 
It is true that the portion of §208.202 quoted by appellant 
(App. Br. 24-25) limits the amount which a carrier may pay 
a travel agent to 5%. But the relevant portion of §208.202 
is quoted hereinabove and prohibits the carrier from paying 
"any commission whatsoever" if the agent receives a commission 
from the charterer. In short, appellant seeks precisely what 
the Regulations forbid. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the Findings and 
Conclusions of the Trial Court are supported by substantial 
evidence, that they are complete and that the judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAMON M. CHILD 
STRONG & HANNI 
GINSBURG AND KOHN 
By: JAMES A. KOHN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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